Hong Kong, October 21 (ANI): Chinese authorities confirmed on October 17 that nine prominent members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which controls every aspect of life in modern China. The announcement came just days before the Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum began on October 20.
If rumors before the four-day conclave are correct, only 168 of 205 members (82%) of the Central Committee and 159 of 171 alternates (93%) are present at the Fourth Plenum. Even worse, perhaps just 17 of 44 (39%) PLA members are attending. If accurate, these figures highlight how severe President Xi Jinping’s purge of the CCP has been in recent months.
The highest-ranking among the nine expelled officers was He Weidong, formerly vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This position made him the number two in the body overseeing the PLA, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the China Coast Guard.
The other expelled officials included Miao Hua, former head of the Political Work Department; He Hongjun, former deputy head of the same department; Wang Xiubin, former deputy chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, former Political Commissar of the PLA Ground Force; Yuan Huazhi, former Political Commissar of the PLA Navy; Wang Houbin, former commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF); and Wang Chunning, former commander of the PAP.
Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, stated, “With approval from the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, the military’s top anti-corruption watchdog, the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, conducted investigations on them successively. The probe found the nine people had committed serious violations of party discipline and are suspected of severe duty-related crimes involving huge amounts, with an extremely serious nature and egregious impact.”
Zhang said the Central Committee expelled the nine from the party and transferred their cases to military prosecutors for further review. They had already been stripped of their military ranks and status.
He added that this announcement “once again demonstrated the CPC Central Committee and the CMC’s firm resolve to carry the anti-corruption campaign through to the end.” He claimed that as a result, China’s armed forces are now “cleaner, more consolidated, and possess stronger cohesion and combat capability.”
The removal of these figures was not a surprise, as investigations had been announced earlier. For instance, Miao Hua was removed from the CMC in June. Miao, along with He Weidong and He Hongjun, appeared to be the worst offenders, singled out for “strict disciplinary action.”
K. Tristian Tang, Associate Fellow at the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs, explained, “The common link between Miao Hua, He Weidong, and He Hongjun—and the charge of ‘serious job-related crimes’—lies in the PLA’s personnel management system. He Weidong served as CMC vice chairman overseeing personnel affairs, while Miao Hua and He Hongjun were the top two officials in the CMC Political Work Department, which manages personnel matters. In other words, problems in the evaluation and promotion of general officers appear to be the central issue.”
Tang suggested the nine appeared to have formed an improper network centered around Miao Hua and He Weidong. Seven of the nine previously served in the Eastern Theater Command, and several also spent extended periods with the 73rd Group Army, likely fostering personal ties.
Tang concluded, “The purge of these nine generals represents one of the most visible examples of CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s ongoing effort to overhaul and tighten control over the PLA’s personnel management system. Xi aims to address long-standing problems in promotion and oversight. This explains why political work and discipline within the PLA this year have placed extraordinary emphasis on personnel management.”
The public shaming of these nine commanders came just days before the conclave to set the agenda for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, which is expected to embed Xi’s vision for China’s techno-industrial dominance. However, based on attendance figures, it could be one of the most sparsely attended plenums in decades, marking a sharp drop from the 199 members and 165 alternates at the Third Plenum last July.
Civilian members of the Central Committee were also missing, including Foreign Minister Qin Gang; Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian; Yu Jianhua, Director of the General Administration of Customs, who died in December 2024; and Jin Xiangjun, Governor of Shanxi. Others under investigation include Lan Tianli, Governor of Guangxi; Wang Lixia, Governor of Inner Mongolia; and Yi Huiman, Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Some officials, such as Lei Fanpei, Executive Deputy Director of the CCP Military-Civil Fusion Commission General Office, and Minister of Industry and Information Technology Jin Zhuanglong, have gone missing entirely.
Neil Thomas, Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, said, “Do all these absences mean Xi is in political trouble? No. Purges show Xi’s political strength, not weakness. Removing high-ranking cadres and generals shows Xi can impose his will on the party and the PLA.”
Thomas noted that while many targets rose under Xi, “after 13 years as leader, everyone has been promoted by Xi these days, and none of the fallen belonged to his true inner circle, such as Li Qiang, Cai Qi, or He Lifeng.” He argued that Xi uses purges to reinforce his power and advance the party’s “self-revolution” into a clean, disciplined, and effective organization capable of ruling China indefinitely.
Thomas added, “Xi’s deepest fear is a Soviet-style collapse of the party and its nation-building project. Fighting graft has sidelined rivals but also advanced Xi’s own China dream.”
He concluded, “Despite the ‘purge surge,’ chances of major reshuffles at the Fourth Plenum are uncertain. Central Committee members are not expelled until after internal investigations, which can take years. More expulsions are likely, but most high-level promotions follow Politburo meetings, not plenums. Xi remains firmly in control and could stay paramount leader for the next 10 to 15 years.”
Dr. William Matthews, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific Programme, said the dismissal of PLA leaders “indicates that loyalty and control of the military are more important than avoiding short-term instability in command structure and significant embarrassment.”
Xi has already emphasized that the PLA must be able to “fight and win wars.” Given China’s ambitions toward Taiwan, Xi requires a military capable of prevailing over the United States in a regional conflict.
Matthews warned, “Material capability is of limited use if not backed up by an effective command structure. Systemic corruption and concerns over loyalty and control have led Xi to extensive purges of the PLA and its industrial complex, alongside measures to restructure the PLA for an era of new military technology.”
In August and September 2025, the PLARF terminated 74 bid evaluation experts and 116 suppliers from future contracts after an investigation into procurement corruption spanning nine years. The crackdown followed the 2023 downfall of Defense Minister Li Shangfu.
Matthews cautioned that Xi’s sweeping purges carry risks. “In addition to reputational costs to Xi himself—whose personal appointments suggest misjudgment—there are consequences for how the PLA is viewed by potential adversaries. Any perception of leadership instability or lack of discipline undermines confidence in the PLA’s ability to coordinate and execute its doctrine effectively.”
He added that such perceptions could embolden Beijing’s adversaries in confronting China’s efforts to coerce Taiwan or assert claims in the South China Sea. “This could also add to the perception that the PLA’s lack of recent combat experience puts it at a disadvantage compared with the US military,” he said.
Despite leadership turmoil, China’s military coercion of Taiwan continues unabated. Still, Matthews believes the internal shakeup suggests Xi is not ready for war. “Until Xi is confident that a stable, loyal, and clean PLA command structure is established, it is unlikely he would seek conflict over Taiwan. The importance of success is so high that the gamble is too risky unless the outcome is all but guaranteed.”
In September, the PLA expelled four additional generals: Zhang Lin, head of the Logistics Support Department; Gao Daguang, Political Commissar of the Joint Logistics Support Force; Wang Zhibin, Secretary of the Rocket Force Discipline Inspection Commission; and Wang Chunning, Commander of the PAP.
The PAP remains a vital political tool for the CCP, responsible for quelling civil unrest. It must remain utterly loyal, especially in potential crisis situations. Xi’s distrust of some top officers underscores his reliance on fear and control to maintain obedience within the military hierarchy.
Jonathan A. Czin, Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, noted, “If Xi’s peers retire, in his fourth term Xi will find himself surrounded by officials a generation younger than he is, with whom he may have little familiarity. In all likelihood, they will be his protégés’ protégés.”
He asked, “Who then can Xi trust—and who can he elevate to fill the gaps he has created?” (ANI)
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