WASHINGTON, DC, US, November 23 (ANI): Former CIA operations officer James Lawler, who led covert missions that penetrated and ultimately exposed AQ Khan’s global nuclear trafficking network, said the turning point came when the United States confronted Pakistan’s leadership with “absolutely incontrovertible evidence” that Khan was selling Pakistan’s nuclear secrets abroad.
In an interview with ANI, Lawler recalled that CIA Director George Tenet personally briefed Pakistan’s then-President Pervez Musharraf that Khan “was betraying Pakistan’s nuclear secrets to at least the Libyans and maybe others.” The revelation sparked an explosive reaction from Musharraf, who reportedly said, “I’m going to kill that son of a bitch,” before opting instead to place Khan under years-long house arrest.
Lawler explained that his assignment in the mid-1990s was to run counterproliferation operations in Europe, eventually gaining authority to “penetrate and sabotage” nuclear procurement networks tied to Khan. His teams built front companies that appeared to be legitimate suppliers and used classic sting techniques, allowing the CIA to infiltrate the network from within.
He said these operations were based on a simple principle: “If you want to defeat proliferation and proliferators, you need to become a proliferator.” The CIA therefore created entities that looked like sellers of sensitive equipment but were designed to map and disrupt nuclear supply lines. These operations were handled by a small team of “no more than 10 people,” supported by field officers abroad.
As intelligence agencies slowly grasped the scale of Khan’s proliferation activities, Lawler observed that Khan had evolved from procuring nuclear technology for Pakistan into an “outward proliferator,” selling designs and components abroad. Lawler nicknamed him the “Merchant of Death,” citing his extensive network and three-decade rise in nuclear trafficking.
One of the decisive moments, he said, came when the CIA intercepted the freighter BBC China and seized containers “filled with nuclear components.” The evidence forced Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to acknowledge his secret nuclear program after Libyan officials were confronted and left in stunned silence before admitting, “By Allah, you’re right. We did have a nuclear program.”
Lawler described how the CIA used technical sabotage to disrupt centrifuge programs while gathering intelligence, relying on methods developed with national laboratories. He said such operations were necessary because failing to act “would be the risk.”
His work initially focused on Iran before shifting to the AQ Khan network, while other US intelligence teams handled North Korea, where access remained extremely limited. He added that early centrifuge designs originating from Urenco spread to several countries through proliferation.
Looking ahead, Lawler warned of the catastrophic consequences if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon. “My biggest concern is the nuclear pandemic this would set off in the Middle East,” he said, predicting a chain reaction of states seeking nuclear capabilities and heightening the risk of accidental or intentional nuclear conflict.
Reflecting on his 25-year CIA career from 1980 to 2005, Lawler shared the origins of his nickname “Mad Dog,” which stemmed from a dog bite incident in France before his counterproliferation work. Now an author of spy novels, he said he remains deeply proud of his mission.
“Stopping countries from getting nuclear weapons—nobody should really argue with that,” he said.
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